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RIGHTS OF A PLAINTIFF WITH REFERENCE TO PROPERTY DELv-

To Him UNDER A DETINUE BOND.-At the common law, the
plaintiff in an action of detinue did not get possession of the property until after final judgment and the issuance of execution. Only
in the action of replevin did he get possession of the property
before judgment. In West Virginia, the action of replevin has
been abolished by statute and the action of detinue has been expanded so as to give the plaintiff the same interlocutory relief by
way of getting preliminary possession of the property which he
formerly got by the action of replevin.' In order to get possession,
ERE

2 W. Va. Code, c. 102; Robinson v. Woodford, 37 W. Va. 377, 16 S. E. 602
(1892) ; Young v. Edwards, 64 W. Va. 67, 60 S. E. 992 (1908).
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the plaintiff must file "an affidavit stating the kind, quantity, and
value of the property claimed by the plaintiff in such action, and
that the affiant verily believes the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the same therein." ' 2 He must also file a bond, "with condition to
pay all costs and damages which rmy be awarded against him, or
sustained by any person by reason of such suit, and to have the
property so claimed forthcoming to answer any judgment or order
of the court or justice respecting the same, made at any time during the pendency of the action." 3 This bond serves the same purpose as the common-law replevy bond and is frequently referred
to as-a replevy bond.
In a recent case,4 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found occasion to discuss the rights and powers, pending the action,
of a plaintiff who has taken possession of property under such a
bond. Certain creditors, it seems, had separate judgments against
a common debtor. Executions issued in pursuance of these judgments were levied by the sheriff and a constable upon an automobile then in the possession of the debtor and the sheriff and the
constable took possession of the automobile. Thereupon, a third
party, claimant of the property, brought an action of detinue
against the judgment creditors and the officers who had levied
the executions, executed a proper affidavit and bond, and took
possession of the automobile. Pending the action, the automobile
was placed in storage by the plaintiff and at the date of the judgment storage charges had accumulated to the amount of $146.25.
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and included
in the judgment, under the designation of "costs", a recovery for
the amount of the storage charges. On petition of the defendants
in the detinue action, the Supreme Court of Appeals issued a writ
of prohibition restraining the collection of this sum. The court,
it is believed, plainly demonstrates that it is an improper item of
recovery, either as "costs" or damages, the statute permitting a
recovery of damages by the plaintiff only for detention of the property by the defendant.5 In undertaking to explain that the plaintiff had assumed an unnecessary burden in putting the property
in storage and permitting the charges to accrue pending the action,
the court, by way of dictum, makes the following statement:
2

W.

Va. Code, c. 102, § 1.

s Idem.
H. P. Dils & Sons v. Waugh, 129 S. E. 703 (W. Va. 1925).
s However, that the plaintiff's contention was not entirely Illogical or unreasonable, Is indicated by the fact that relief of a more or less similar nature is given
by statute in some of the states. See Pa. Statutes, 1920, 9 18972; Page and Adams,
Ohio Geaeral Code. Vol. 5, §§ 12057, 12063.
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"Here the damages claimed by the plaintiff accrued to it while
the property was in its possession. It had the use of the automobile, and could have sold it, before there was any depreciation
in its value, or without incurring storage charges. It was
eventually answerable only for the value of the ear, under its
bond. Gordon v. Jenny, supra. The statute contemplates this
by requiring the jury to find the value of the property in question, as well as the right to possession. In this ease the plaintiff's
claim did not arise by reason of defendant's actual detention of
the property. By either using the automobile, or by converting
it into money, plaintiff could have saved dead storage charges,
and at least reduced to a minumum the depreciation claimed."
Apparently, this statement is intended to establish the conclusion that the detinue bond is an absolute substitute for the property in an action of detinue. Seemingly, it is considered that the
plaintiff, after getting possession of the property by virtue of the
bond, not only has the power, but has the right, to deal with the
property as his own and, before the title has been finally adjudicated, to make such disposition of it as to place it forever beyond
the reach of the defendant. The court, saying that "the statute
contemplates this", would seem to indicate that the statute commends and encourages a use or sale of the property by the plaintiff. If such is the conclusion to be drawn, it would appear that
any person, through the mechanism of an action of detinue, may
be compelled to suffer a forced sale of his property, and that too
without the privilege of fixing the amount of the purchase price;
for if the plaintiff has the power to sell, of course he must have
the power to pass title. In view of the radical results that may
come from a too literal and comprehensive application of the statement, an application perhaps not intended by the court, it is
deemed pertinent to inquire into the holdings of other courts where
the question has actually been adjudicated.
The only case cited by the court in the principal ease to sustain
its conclusions is the Massachusetts case of Gordon v. Jenney,6
which was an action of replevin. As the court indicates, owing to
the effect of the local statutes already referred to, cases of replevin
from other states may be accepted as authorities in point in this
state. It should be noted, however, that the modern action of replevin in most cases is largely a statutory action and an interpretation of the decisions usually involves matters of local statutory
construction. For this reason, the courts express a reluctance to
0 16 Mass. 465 (1820).
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seek the aid of outside decisions for the purpose of settling controverted questions. It will be found, however, that for the purpose
of determining the rights of a plaintiff under a replevy bond, the
majority of the courts are largely controlled by two considerations:
(1) the nature of the condition in the bond, and (2) the nature
of the defendant's property rights.
Originally, the action of replevin was proper only where the
plaintiff undertook to recover property that had been distrained
by the defendant.- The ground of recovery was that the distraint
had been unlawful 8 The title to the property was not in dispute.
So strictly was this true, that a mere claim of title by the defendant prevented a replevy of the property and of course caused an
abatement of the proceeding.9 Hence in these first cases, the replevy
bond was always a sufficient protection for the defendant and could
logically be treated as an absolute substitute for the property. In
fact, it seems that the earliest replevy bonds were not conditioned
for the return of the property at all.20 In modern times, either by
expansion of the common law or by virtue of statute, the field of
replevin has been expanded so as to cover not only all instances of
unlawful taking but likewise an unlawful detention of property,
regardless of the manner in which the defendant acquired pos.
session. Hence in most states the statutes require the bond to be
conditioned for the return of the property. Where the bond is
not conditioned for the return of the property, it has been held
that the bond is an absolute substitute for the property." Consequently, when the plaintiff gets possession of the property by
virtue of such a bond, it is held that he may deal with it as his
own and, of course, may sell it and pass title to a third party. In
other cases, regardless of the nature of the condition of the bond,
it is held that the bond may be regarded as a substitute for the
property when the defendant does not claim title to the property,
as where he held it for the mere purpose of securing the payment
of a debt.'2 In such cases, of course, the nature of his possession
oi special property interest would rebut any presumption that he
was interested in the intrinsic value of the specific property. But
7

3 STREET, FOUNDATONS

OF LEGAL LIABILITY, c. XVI.

Idem.
. Idem, pp. 212-213.
10 Idem, p. 211.
n Smith v. McGregor, 10 Oh. St. 461 (1860).
"
Bruner v. Dyball, 42 Ill.34 (1866), citing Speer v. Skinucer, 35 I1. 282
(1864) ; Gimble v. Ackley, 12 Iowa 27 (1861); Union Nat. Bank of Oshkosh W.
Milburn & Stoddard Co., 7 N. D. 201, 73 N. W. 527 (1897). See Lockwood v. Perry,
infra.
a
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where the general ownership of the property is in dispute, and the
bond is conditioned for a return of the property, the weight of
authority seems to be to the effect that the bond is not a substitute
for the property, and that the plaintiff, pending the action, has no
right to make any disposition of the property that will impair the
rights of the defendant as a possible owner depending upon the
final judgment of the court.' 3 During the interval between the
replevy of the property and the final judgment, the property is
said to be in the custody of the law.'" The Indiana court, referring
to the nature of the plaintiffs' possession, says, "they were in custody by virtue of the process of the court, and really as its
agents." 1 The Montana court, answering the contention that the
plaintiff has a right to make a disposition of the property pending
the action, says :16
"This theory would give the property to a party confessedly
in the wrong, and authorize him to convert it to his own use at
pleasure, while he could only be held to account for its value.
The law does not give any such privilege to a wrong-doer."
This case emphasizes the fact that the plaintiff's possession is only
tentative and temporary, depending upon the result of the final
adjudication, the very object of the action being to make a disposition of the specific property and not to compensate in damages.
Following are the views of the Illinois court :17
"It is again insisted that, inasmuch as the statute requires the
plaintiff, in an action of replevin, to execute a bond and security
for the return of the property before it is delivered to him, the
only remedy of the defendant, in case the plaintiff fails to succeed, is by a recovery on the bond. All the authorities agree, that
the suing out of the writ of replevin and obtaining possession of
the property under the writ in no wise changes the ownership. The
plaintiff does not thereby become the owner of the property.
He simply, under the law, becomes its custodian, until the right
is determined by a judgment of a court on a trial of their respective claims of ownership. Before he can obtain the property,
he is required to give bond with security for the return of the
property if he fails to establish his right, and, if he does not
establish his right, the judgment is, that he shall return it to the
Schwartz v. Pillow, 50 Ark. 300, 7 S. W. 167, Am. St. Rep. 28 (1888) ; Lockwood -v.Perry, 50 Mass. 440 (1845); Maunausau v. Wallace, 87 Mich. 543, 49 N.
W. 1082 (1891) ; Mohr v. Langan, 162 Mo. 474, 63 S. W. 409, 85 Am. St. Rep. 503
(1901) ; Hawkins v. Taylor & Bush, 15 Mo. App. 238 (1884) ; Caldwell v. Gans, 1
Mont 570 (1872); Farnhamu v. Chapman, 60 Vt. 338, 14 Atl. 690 (1888).
See
cases cited in preceding note and infra.
14 Idem.
Is Pipher v. Fordyce, 88 Ind. 438 (1882).
3
Caldwell v. Gans, n. 13 supra.
2T Bruner v Dyball, n. 12 aupra.
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former possessor. It is then manifest, that he acquires no right
by the suing out of a writ of replevin, obtaining possession of
the property, and then dismissing his suit. If such were the
case, any person could, at pleasure, become the owner of the
property of another, against his will, only subject to the payment of such a price as should be fixed by a jury. The object
of the bond required by the statute, is to give the defendant an
additional remedy, in case the property is wasted or consumed,
or, perhaps, when it has been sold to an innocent purchaser."
It will be noted that the court in this case hints that the plaintiff might pass title to an innocent purchaser. But there can be
no implication from this language to the effect that the statute
authorizes him to do so or that he has a right to do so. The fact
that the purchaser must be an innocent one implies the turpitude
that would attach to the unauthorized sale. Moreover, the fact
that there may be even an innocent purchaser is denied by actual
adjudication in other cases ;18 and it is further held that, pending
the action, the property can not be taken from the plaintiff by
process of law so as to jeopardize the rights of the defendant. 9
It is pertinent to note that the purport of the broad statements
in Gordon v. Jenney, the case cited to sustain the proposition in
the principal case, has been considerably narrowed by a later opinion2o expressing the views of the same court. Since Gordon v.
Jenney is the only ease cited to sustain the statements in the principal case, it may be excusable to quote somewhat at length from
the later opinion.
"The position taken by the defendant, that the object and
purpose of the writ of replevin are to transfer the possession of
the article replevied to the plaintiff in replevin, is certainly
well maintained, if by possession be understood a possession for
the time being. The further position, that the plaintiff in replevin, after the service of the writ, has a right to sell the property thus replevied, and may give to the purchaser a good, indefeasible title, which will not be affected by a judgment in
favor of the defendant in replevin, is one more difficult to be
sustained. If it were limited to replevin in cases of wrongful
distress of personal chattels for rent, or of cattle damage feasant,
it might be more readily assented to; as in such cases the property is held by the defendant in replevin for a particular purpose, and he does not claim to be the owner of it. And where the
plaintiff in replevin, who in such case is the actual owner, has
Is N.

13 supra.
29 Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Il. 455 (1846) ; Pipher v. Fordyce, note 15 supra; McKinney v. Purcell, 28 Kan. 446 (1882).
See cases cited in note :13 supra.
20 Lockwood v. Perry, n. 13 sup'a, pp. 444-5.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss2/5

6

C.: Rights of a Plaintiff With Reference to Property Delivered to Him
EDITORIAL NOTES

given the requisite security, by a bond, to pay such rent, or such
damages, if the property is not returned, it may be all that is
requisite to do perfect justice between the parties. Whether a
like principle should be applied to the case of replevin, in its
extensive use now sanctioned by the laws of Massachusetts, requires more consideration.
"The proposition is, that any one who will avail himself of
the forms of. law in instituting his action of replevin, merely
alleging property in himself, and giving bonds, may, upon the
service of the writ of replevin, sell the property replevied.
absolutely and by an indefeasible title, and thus divest the real
owner of his property, irrespective of the judgment in the action
of replevin. The language of this court, in Gordon v. Jenney,
16 Mass. 469, is strongly relied upon as sustaining such a doctrine. Taken literally, and without any restriction to its application to the facts before the court, it would sustain that view
of the question. -But, as it seems to us, it is to be qualified by
reference to the circumstances of that case. The plaintiff was
there insisting upon his right to recover damages, by reason of a
deterioration of the value of the goods pending the action of
replevin. In answer to his claim, the court say, he is entitled
to no damages on this account: 'He may sell them. They are
delivered to him upon the assertion that they are his property,
and he has it in his power to deal with them as such.' But the
case before the court was that of a plaintiff in replevin who was
the real owner of the property replevied. That had been already settled. Such a plaintiff in replevin may, of course, deal
with the goods replevied as his own. He has the possession
and the right of property, and therefore all the facilities, and all
the legal rights too, requisite to make a legal transfer. In ordinary cases, the purchaser buys subject to the question of the
vendor's title; and we think none the less so because the vendor
has acquired his possession under a writ of replevin issued upon
his own representation, and which may be wholly unfounded in
truth. We perceive no sufficient reason for sanctioning the
broad doctrine, that by reason of the mere fact that he has
acquired his possession through the instrumentality of a writ of
replevin, his vendee has acquired thereby an indefeasible title
as against everybody. It is doubtless true that the plaintiff in
replevin has, by virtue of his writ, acquired the right of possession pending the action of replevin, and that the real owner
cannot disturb that right during the pendeney of the action,
nor institute an action against a third person who may become
possessed of the goods. And this is precisely the extent of the
right exercised by force of a writ of replevin. This view of the
question is fatal to the defence, as presented upon the general
position, that by virtue of the writ of replevin and giving of
bonds to prosecute the same, the property absolutely vested in
the plaintiff in replevin."
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It will be noted that under the West Virginia statute the bond
is conditioned for the return of the property. The plaintiff undertakes to have it "forthcoming to answer any judgment or order
of the court or justice respecting the same, made at any time during the pendency of the action." Hence under the authorities
hereinbefore cited, the bond is not a substitute for the property,
but merely-supplies the defendant with a means of securing secondary relief in the event that the plaintiff does not live up to his
legal obligation to return the property in the event of a judgment
for the defendant. The common-law system of pleading prevails
in West Virginia. The ordinary counts in detinue are largely fictitious. Most defenses are asserted under the broad general issue.
Contrary to the situation prevailing in many of the states where
the common-law procedure has been largely superseded by statutes,
under the West Virginia procedure there is little in the pleadings
to indicate to what extent or in what manner the title may be in
dispute. Ordinarily, throughout the pendency of the action, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove title to the property and the
presumption is that the defendant is the owner. Undoubtedly the
reason why the law permits the plaintiff to get preliminary possession of the property, is in order that he may preserve specific
property which he particularly desires to keep in lieu of claiming
damages for its conversion. He does not take the property as a
mere security for compensation. He is not permitted to take it
because of any presumption that the defendant is insolvent or that
he will in the interim do anything with his property that will interfere with the satisfaction of a money recovery. The object is
solely to insure that the plaintiff will get the fruits of his final
judgment for the specific property. For the same reasons, justice
would require that the defendant's rights with reference to the
specific property be equally protected. Consequently, the statute
provides that the defendant may regain possession by giving a
counter forthcoming bond. 21

This is reasonable.

Sivce both

parties can not have possession at the same time,22 and the defendant's possession at the beginning of the action creates the presumption that he has the title, it is fair that he, on giving bond, should
be favored with the final choice of possession pending the action.
Nor, it is believed, can the fact that the defendant prefers to let
21 W Va. Code, c. 102, § 4.
22 It is interesting to note that in one state, if the property is of pceullarly intrinsic value to the defendant, the law does not permit the plaintiff to hold the property pending the action, but requires the officer to keep it. Page and Adams, Ohio
General Code. Vol. 5. § 12058.
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the plaintiff retain possession pending the action, rather than to
give the counter bond and regain possession himself, create any
presumption that the property has been finally surrendered to the
plaintiff. The condition of the plaintiff's bond is that he will keep
the property subject to the order of the court. The defendant has
a right to trust that the plaintiff will not violate the condition of his
bond. Moreover, the defendant may not be financially able to give
bond with the proper security, and his poverty should not be permitted to operate against him so as to compel a forced sale of his
property. The language of the statute would indicate that the
primary relief which it contemplates is recovery of the specific
property.23 That this is true when judgment is rendered for the
plaintiff is clearly indicated in a late decision.24 The facts of the
case were as follows: Bills sued Monroe in detinue to recover a
cow. Pending the action, Monroe sold the cow to Damecki. Bills
recovered judgment in the usual alternative form and execution
was issued. A deputy sheriff, claiming that he was unable to find
the cow, seized the alternative value and tendered it to Bills. Bills
refused to accept the money value and the deputy sheriff deposited
the money with the clerk of the court. Bills caused a second execution to be issued and placed in the hands of a constable, who took
the cow from Daineeki and delivered her to Bills. Thereupon,
Dameeki brought an action of detinue against Bills to recover the
cow. It was contended on behalf of Dameeki that the tender to
Bills of the alternative value by the deputy sheriff precluded him
from thereafter claiming any property in the cow. In answer to
this contention, the court says:
"In an action of detinue to recover specific property, a sheriff's return on a writ of distringas, showing execution by taking
the alternative value of the property, does not preclude the
plaintiff who dclines to accept such alternative value from obtaining the specific property under another writ subsequently
issued.
"A plaintiff in detinue is entitled to insist on having the
specific property, if obtainable, and is not required to accept the
alternative value of the property recovered, on a tender by the
sheriff, until reasonable efforts to obtain the specific property
have failed."
The court, in finding that Bills, in the second action, was entitled
to retain the property, decided that there could not be a valid sale
W. Va. Code, c. 102, § 6.

24 Damecki v. Bills, 88 W. Va. 246, 106 S. E. 629 (1921).
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of the property by Monroe pending the first action. The court
says:
"One who purchases from a party to a pending action of
detinue the subject matter involved in the litigation takes it subject to the final disposition of the case, and is bound by the judgment that is entered against the party from whom he derived
title. "
While this was a case adjudicating the rights of the plaintiff, it
should be noted that the statute places the rights of the defendant
on a precisely equal basis, the form of the judgment being the
same in either case.25 If it is necessary to look beyond the terms
of the statute for the purpose of defining the defendant's rights,
it is believed that, independently of the statute, there are reasons
why the defendant's rights to the specific property should be protected even more strictly than the rights of the plaintiff. The defendant is the party who was originally in possession and the effect
of his original possession is to create a presumption, throughout
the pendency of the action, that he has title to the property.
Of course, pending an action of detinue, the plaintiff may in any
case undertake to make a sale or other disposition of the property.
There is no physical force to prevent him, and if he finally gets
judgment for the property, the sale or other disposition cannot
be disturbed by the defendant. The plaintiff may conscientiously
be willing to take such a risk, depending upon the circumstances
of the case; or he may act with utter disregard for the defendant's
rights. But when he so acts, may he not be subjecting the rights
of the defendant to a risk not contemplated by the law? When he
so acts, is he not acting in spite of the law, rather than in pursuance of the law? Does the law contemplate that the defendant's
property rights should depend upon the plaintiff's sagacity by
way of predicting what the future judgment of the court will be?
This discussion should not be concluded without suggesting that
the circumstances of the principal case may be such as to bring it
within a class of exceptions heretofore noted to the general rule.
It will be recalled that the principal defendants were interested in
the property only as execution creditors, and presumably had no
interest in the specific property as such. They were interested
merely in securing a monetary satisfaction of their debts.
-L. C.
-3 W. Va. Code, c. 102, § 6.
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